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Intellectual Property at the Boundary Katherine J. Strandburg
In the first of several articles inspired by Eric von Hippel's work (see, e.g., von
Hippel 2005) I argued that patent doctrine implicitly assumes a "seller innovator"
and discussed whether the standard theoretical justifications for patents would apply to user innovators (Strandburg 2008) . Patents ordinarily are justified by the need to provide incentives for invention, disclosure of inventive ideas, and dissemination of embodiments of those inventions. The underlying premise is that, unless exclusive rights are available, concerns about free-riding competitors will either undermine incentives to invest in coming up with new inventions and bringing them to market (incentives to invent and to disseminate) or encourage secrecy as a way to guard against free-riding (hence, the incentive to disclose rationale). After interrogating the incentive issues, I concluded that "in general, patent protection is less necessary and more costly for user innovations than for seller innovations." (Strandburg 2008) My more recent scholarship reconsiders another implicit assumption underlying much of patent doctrine -the assumption of the atomistic inventor (or, perhaps, firm) (Madison et al. 2010) . Over the past few years, intellectual property scholarship has come to recognize that creative work often takes place within groups in which knowledge, ideas, or creative expression are shared or 2 exchanged according to governance regimes that are distinct both from markets based on legally-defined intellectual property rights and from hierarchicallyorganized firms. Many such governance regimes are "constructed cultural commons" arrangements, in which information is pooled and shared in a manner suggestive of the regimes governing "common pool resources" studied by Elinor
Ostrom (Ostrom 2005) . Others are non-IP-based trading practices, such as what Eric von Hippel has called "know-how trading" (von Hippel 1987) . Still others, like the practices of French chefs, constitute "norms-based intellectual property systems," based on informally-defined property-like rights (Fauchart and von Hippel 2008) . Though a more complete understanding of such information governance regimes awaits the accumulation of more empirical studies, it appears that such arrangements are commonplace, if not ubiquitous. Significant creative work-whether or not for commercial purposes-takes place in creative groups 1 whose interactions are not primarily grounded either in market transactions in legally-defined intellectual property or in top-down task management, but are organized by some alternative governance regime.
For creative groups, I argue here, legally-defined intellectual property is important for the most part only when they must negotiate a boundary between the group and outsiders. Though there are parallels to some of these boundary situations in the paradigmatic context of the atomistic individual or firm, here I will focus particularly on the ways in which boundary issues play out for creative groups organized under alternative information governance regimes.
Part 1 of this chapter discusses why creative groups might choose to opt out of the legally-defined intellectual property 2 regime for purposes of their internal interactions. Part 2 explains why intellectual property raises special concerns when such groups navigate boundary situations. Part 3 concludes with a call for more research attention to these issues.
Why Creative Groups Opt Out of Legally-Defined Intellectual Property
The simple, oft-repeated, justification for intellectual property-that a potential award of exclusive rights to ward off free riding competitors is necessary to provide ex ante incentives for creative work 3 -is problematic, and increasingly so, for a variety of reasons. It is premised on three assumptions, all of which are contestable, particularly in many situations involving ongoing group creative activity:
1) Creative work requires large up-front investments;
2) Free riding will prevent a sufficient return on those investments; and 3) Legally-defined property rights are the only or best way to allocate returns on investments in creative work.
First Assumption: Creative Work Requires Large Investments
Producing information-based goods and services potentially may require large investments in: 1) tools of creative work (such as laboratories, paintbrushes and computers), 2) organization and communication of cooperative creative work, 3) design processes to codify information in useable embodiments, 4) production of embodiments, and 5) the human capital necessary for the work. In what is by now becoming an old story, many of these costs are decreasing, some radically, as a result of digital technology. While declining costs of production are most apparent for digital embodiments, the costs of fabricating many kinds of tangible goods are also in rapid decline. Investments in human capital, while expensive, are often multi-purpose and can be recouped over many different activities and over long periods of time. As an example, the expertise and skills required for the creative work of user innovation may have been acquired for or as a result of using a particular technology, meaning that little or no additional investment in human capital may be needed for user innovation.
Of course, not all creative work is strongly affected by the decreasing costs resulting from digital technology. And for some enterprises, such as some areas of scientific research, the decreasing costs of these technologies are more than matched by increasing costs as the problems become more complex.
Moreover, the upfront cost of human capital required for creative work can be high, particularly in arenas for which complex, specialized expertise is required.
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The bottom line, however, is that the assumption that large upfront investment is required to produce creative work is untenable in a number of arenas.
Second Assumption: Free Riding Will Prevent a Sufficient Return on
Investment in Creative Work
The assumption that free riding will prevent sufficient return on investment is sometimes valid in practice, but often it is not. Free riding is a problem only if it interferes with an investor's ability to recoup sufficient rewards, by which we ordinarily mean sufficient to cover her costs (including opportunity costs) and possibly some reasonable return on investment. Thus, even where free riding is a concern, first mover advantage 4 may provide a sufficient return on investment.
Note that the first and second assumptions are intertwined: The lower the investment needed for creative work, the less likely it is that free riding will interfere with its recoupment. (The same technological advances that lower the costs of producing creative work may also decrease the first mover advantage by lowering the costs of copying, however.)
The assumption that free riding will deter creative activity is false for many kinds of creative work, which provide adequate returns to their creators without any need for intellectual property rights. There are at least three reasons why this may be the case.
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First, some rewards for creative activity are non-rivalrous and there is simply no potential for free riding. For example, one of the rewards of writing music or creating a work of art is enjoying its beauty. The creator's enjoyment of the beauty of a creative work is not only non-rivalrous; it may be increased by others' enjoyment of the work. Depending on the context, the reward to a user innovator of using her innovation may be non-rivalrous-undecreased or even augmented by others' use.
Second, some rewards are rivalrous, but not free-ride-able. The intrinsic satisfaction of engaging in a particular creative act may be rivalrous to some degree-only one person can enjoy the pleasure of being the first to make a particular discovery, for example-but it is also inextricably bound to the person who has made the effort and no one can free ride on it. Reputational rewards for creative work may be rivalrous if they determine status or career opportunities, but, depending on the difficulty of verifying the source of the work, it may or may not be possible for anyone else to make off with them.
Finally, the dynamics of creative groups can sometimes shift the costbenefit balance so that the costs of free riding are outweighed by the benefits of free revealing. Within the context of a creative group, such as a user innovator community, sharing one's creative output can bring benefits including reputational rewards, access to other's innovations, opportunities for collaboration, and opportunities to improve one's creative output with the 7 assistance of the group. (Harhoff et al. 2003 ; see also Strandburg 2008) .
Moreover, while a lone creator might have to incur costs to disclose and disseminate her creative output, the costs of doing so in a creative group are often minimal, simply because group members provide a readily accessible, interested, and knowledgeable audience for the disclosure. Indeed, it may be difficult or impossible to participate in the activities of a given creative group while hiding one's innovations, thus raising the costs of secrecy in comparison to free revealing.
In sum, there undoubtedly are many situations in which the potential for free riding would not deter the creation, disclosure, or dissemination of creative output. This is not to suggest that free riding is never an issue for creative groups.
Members of creative groups often do compete for rivalrous rewards that must be allocated among group members and in such cases fear of free riding has the potential to undermine creative activity. This brings us to the third assumption.
Third Assumption: Legally Defined Property Rights are the Only or Best
Way to Allocate Returns on Investment in Creative Work
Even if there are important rewards for creative work (money being the prime example) that must be allocated among competing claimants, the assumption that legally-defined intellectual property is the best or only solution to the problem of allocating these rivalrous rewards is often false if the claimants are part of an 8 ongoing creative group. A great deal of creative work takes place within commercial firms, for example, which allocate rewards for creative effort according to many mechanisms-salaries, bonuses, sabbaticals, awards-but do not use legally-defined intellectual property internally, presumably because the transaction costs of doing so would be too high. 5 The academic research system also allocates rivalrous rewards, but does so according to publication and peerreview-based mechanisms quite apart from legally-defined intellectual property.
In both of these contexts, legally-defined intellectual property rights come into play only (if at all) at the boundary of the creative group. Open source software projects licensed with a "copyleft" provision (which mandates that those who These examples are not special. While legally-defined property rights in tangible goods seem, for the most part, to function well in day-to-day interactions, such is often not the case for intellectual property rights. From the outset, property rights are less desirable for managing creative output than for dealing with tangible goods because they impose exclusivity on nonrivalrous creations.
Furthermore, the intellectual property system tends to function rather badly as a property system because, among other things, of the difficulty in defining the property itself (see, e.g., Dorfman and Jacob 2011, Bessen and Meurer 2008) .
Of course, intellectual property rights may be more or less well-suited to different creative enterprises. If creative outputs are well-delineated, with relatively well-understood potential embodiments and relatively predictable downstream co-mingling, the legally-defined contours of patent or copyright may "fit" relatively well. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case, meaning that, despite its potential to solve various incentive problems, intellectual property is a costly system for structuring creative interactions.
Because of these inherent problems with legally-defined intellectual property rights, it is not surprising that, where feasible, creative groups often adopt other institutional mechanisms to govern the flow of creative inputs and outputs within the group. Even groups whose participants seek individual rewards or want some type of exclusive rights to their creative outputs may find that the advantages of the ready-made, legally-defined intellectual property regime are outweighed by its costs in comparison to a "custom-made" governance regime.
For a group to adopt such an alternative to legally-defined intellectual property, the group must have some workable means of defining and enforcing the alternative regime. There are numerous paths by which groups accomplish this. Some groups−high end French chefs (Fauchart and von Hippel 2008) regimes from emerging, in practice they emerge with considerable regularity and serve to solve free rider problems in lieu of legally-defined intellectual property.
Intellectual Property's Place at the Boundary
Even when a creative group does not employ legally-defined intellectual property in its internal interactions, intellectual property may remain important in negotiating the boundary between the group and outsiders, where the internal governance system is impotent. Boundary negotiation is not equally important to all creative groups, of course. Some groups are essentially self-sufficient creators and consumers of their own creative output. For these groups legally-defined intellectual property matters not one whit. Creative groups must negotiate boundaries, however, if they 1) desire to make use of pre-existing creative work by an outsider, 2) inadvertently infringe the intellectual property rights of an outsider, 3) seek to deter outsiders from appropriating their creative output or 4)
desire to engage outsiders in collaborative creative work, such as, for example, by collaborating with manufacturers to disseminate embodiments of the group's creative output. Intellectual property may also be deployed as a means to align a creative group's incentives with social value (for example, when it would be socially valuable to invest in disclosing or disseminating the creative work to outsiders but the creative group lacks interest in doing so).
Using legally-defined intellectual property to negotiate these boundary issues may not always be desirable, however. Depending on both the group context and the legal design of the intellectual property system, making intellectual property available as a boundary-spanning mechanism may threaten to undermine the group's internal governance regime, resulting in an all-or-nothing tradeoff between the two regimes.
In what follows I briefly analyze each of these boundary issues. Each but the last closely parallels a situation that routinely arises for individuals and firms, yet the implications for creative groups are distinct. Individuals and firms can often negotiate their interactions with other creators in terms of money or intellectual property. Creative groups, however, may lack workable means of transacting in these forms or the costs to the group of doing so may high. In addition, boundary transactions often are complicated for creative groups by inconsistencies between the legally-defined intellectual property regime and the group's information governance regime.
Employing Outsiders' Creative Work
Like individuals and firms, creative groups may desire to employ the creative work of outsiders as inputs to their own creative activities. Some groups avoid this boundary situation because all the creative input they need is created by members of the group and subject to the group's governance regime. This is, for 
Inadvertent Infringement of an Outsider's Intellectual Property
Any creator, whether an individual, firm or creative group, can trespass inadvertently on someone else's intellectual property rights. Unsophisticated creators are likely to be uninformed or mistaken about the scope of others' intellectual property rights. Even sophisticated parties regularly find themselves infringing inadvertently because of the vague boundaries and insufficient notice often characteristic of intellectual property rights. Since both patent and copyright are strict liability causes of action, lack of intent to infringe is not a defense.
The copyright infringement standard, particularly in the area of derivative works, is notoriously vague and the fair use doctrine, while serving critical social goals, contributes to the vagueness of the property boundaries. Thus, even though copyright liability requires copying, follow-on creators cannot always easily determine what they are legally permitted to copy. Patent law, because it does not require copying for infringement to occur, can impose liability even on independent inventors. Difficulties in searching prior patents may make avoiding infringement costly and problems of claim construction make boundaries virtually impossible to ascertain in some fields.
As has been widely discussed (often in terms of the "patent troll" The realistic danger to a creative group's project from inadvertent infringement of outsider intellectual property thus depends greatly upon the group's technology, its information governance regime, how difficult it is to re-design around the outsider intellectual property, and the identities (and depths of pockets) of its members.
Outsider Appropriation of the Group's Creative Output
The potential for free rider appropriation of creative output is the canonical justification for intellectual property and often is of concern to individuals and firms. Though a creative group's governance regime handles internal free rider issues, it is unlikely to deter outsider appropriation of the group's creative output.
While some creative groups' goals may be indifferent to or furthered by outsiders'
use of the group's creative output, other groups may seek to control or profit from outsider use. Thus, the potential for appropriation by outsiders may threaten to decrease a group's anticipated rewards sufficiently to depress its creative output, just as free riding is expected to do for the canonical commercially-motivated individual or firm.
Most obviously, if a creative group seeks to sell embodiments of its creative output for a profit, then sales by a free-riding outsider reduce the available profits. Even if a creative group seeks non-pecuniary rewards, such as reputational enhancement, from outsiders, appropriation of the group's output by an outsider may diminish those rewards. Motivations for creative work may also be undermined if an outsider's appropriation of the group's creative output is perceived as unfair or inconsistent with the group's goals and norms. Even those who are altruistically motivated to create may be unwilling to invest in creative work if someone else will use it to rake in profits.
For user innovator communities, for example, an outsider's free riding could have real or perceived monetary costs. Consider the situation in which a manufacturer builds on the community's work to produce embodiments for sale to community members. Because outsider manufacturers often obtain intellectual property rights, intellectual property doctrine often determines the price that they are able to charge for such embodiments. In a well-functioning intellectual property system, the price premium a manufacturer can charge should reflect only the value of its own contributions to producing the embodiment, since otherwise competitors could undercut the price. However, if the intellectual property system provides overly-broad rights (or if they are perceived as overly broad by the creative group), the community may believe that a manufacturer's prices are excessively high relative to the manufacturer's contributions. This perception of unfairness might depress the group's willingness to engage in creative activity.
More directly, the need to pay an inappropriately high price for products incorporating the group's creative output places a tax on the group's ability to produce follow-on creative output.
In sum, there are a variety of ways in which appropriation of a group's creative output by outsiders can decrease the rewards available to creative groups.
Just like individuals or firms concerned with free riders, creative groups might, in principle, deter or survive outsider free riding using various means. Note, however, that only some of these mechanisms, such as intellectual property and secrecy, permit fine-grained control over what outsiders can do with the group's creative output, which may be essential to some groups' achieving their goals.
(Consider, for example, the various flavors of open source or Creative Commons licenses.) 10 Secrecy is unavailable for many creative groups, so intellectual property may be the most attractive option. Of course, the details of intellectual property doctrine affect the possibilities. For example, because patent infringement liability does not require proof of copying, patent equivalents to the "copyleft" license have yet to be devised.
Collaborating with Outsiders
To produce or disseminate useful embodiments of their creative work, individuals, firms, and creative groups at times may need to collaborate with outsiders who have needed expertise or resources. Of course, some creative groups may not need outside expertise. Digital embodiments often are produced without outside collaboration, for example. Even if the creative output is embodied in tangible things, such as sweaters, ham radios, or research tools, group members may be willing and able to make embodiments of the output themselves. Groups sometimes also make internal collective arrangements for the collection, codification and supply of embodiments to the group (or even to outsiders). Examples of such arrangements include some peer-reviewed journals, biological resource centers, databanks, conferences, regimes for producing "official" versions of open source software, and informal trading regimes.
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When outside expertise is needed, it may be possible for group members to contract for it at an hourly or piece rate or through salaried employment, as is routinely done for tasks such as editing, website design, and publishing. Advances in custom manufacturing, including most importantly the advent of 3D printing, are rapidly expanding the types of situations in which this is possible. When it is, there may be no need for any other boundary spanning mechanism.
At other times, however, the necessary creative collaboration with an outsider may not be achievable by contracting for services. Collaboration of this sort may be necessary, for example, when each side has "sticky" knowledge that resists easy codification. Facilitating such collaborations is, by some lights, a primary purpose of intellectual property, which facilitates collaboration by resolving Arrow's paradox, spreading risks, and reducing the costs of contracting for joint creative effort.
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Cross-boundary collaborations may raise special difficulties for creative groups. They may be disadvantaged in bargaining over the terms of the collaboration at the outset if some part of their creative output required for the project has already been placed in the public domain. Furthermore, collaboration with outsiders is likely to require investments of time and effort by only some members of the creative group. The investments made by these representative members may be substantial and their opportunity costs quite high. Compensating such "representatives" appropriately for boundary-spanning efforts that benefit the group as whole may be tricky. Intellectual property rights based on crossboundary collaborations will generally be awarded to the individuals involved, rather than to the creative group as a whole. It thus provides, in principle, not only a means to negotiate the boundary between a creative group and outside collaborators, but also a mechanism by which representative members can "collect" from the rest of the group. While it may effectively serve this purpose, intellectual property resulting from boundary work may also cause contention within the group. It may be difficult to draw lines between the portion of a group member's creative output properly allocated to her individual efforts in the outside collaboration and the portion that should be compensated according to the internal governance regime. Because of these complications, intellectual property obtained by group members as a result of collaboration with outsiders may have the potential to destabilize a creative group's internal information governance regime.
Aligning a Creative Group's Incentives with Social Value
Potential misalignment between the social value of creating, disclosing, or disseminating creative output and the value of those activities to a creative group itself is simply another wrinkle on the traditional intellectual property justifications. Even if a creative group's internal governance mechanisms do an excellent job of allocating rewards for creative activity among those within the group, there will still be circumstances in which a creative group's internal incentives to create, disclose, and disseminate its creative output do not align with the output's potential value to the larger society. For example, optimizing the social value of a group's creative output may sometimes demand substantial investment in tasks such as developing it into a form that is usable by outsiders, maintaining its accessibility to outsiders, and producing and disseminating embodiments of the output that are entirely different from those desired by the group. Without some means to force outsiders to pay for such efforts, the creative 23 group may have insufficient motivation to engage in (or pay for) these development, codification, and dissemination tasks.
For example, a community of lead users may not have sufficient incentives to bear the cost of disclosing and disseminating its creative output to less expert users. Academic researchers may have insufficient incentives to bridge the gap between research results that are of interest to them and technology that is useful to society. Similarly, members of the community that creates Wikipedia presumably are motivated intrinsically to do the work involved in creating and editing its entries and desire to share the results online with as many people as possible. Nonetheless, community members may not be sufficiently motivated to pay the costs of maintaining the necessary servers and other infrastructure, especially as those costs becomes very large. Indeed, Wikipedia has conducted public radio-type fundraising drives, seeking the financial support of outsiders who benefit from the community's activities.
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Intellectual property is one potential means to increase a creative group's incentives to invest in disclosing and disseminating its creative output in a form that is valuable to outsiders. University technology transfer provides an illuminating and, in my view, cautionary example of an attempt to deploy intellectual property in this way. In 1980, the US Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act, 14 which encouraged the patenting of academic researchers' inventions.
Patenting was supposed to provide incentives to invest in bridging a presumed 24 gap between the ivory towers of academic science and the commercial market. Its effectiveness in doing so is a subject of considerable dispute, however. 15 Indeed, I will argue here that the main result of university patenting may have been to encourage university researchers to use patents to monetize the immediate results of publicly-financed research that they would have performed without the patent incentive.
The most commonly articulated theory behind the Bayh-Dole Act is that exclusive licenses to patents on university research output will motivate companies to invest in developing applications of the research. It has never been entirely clear, however, why such an incentive is needed, given that a company developing downstream applications of upstream research results ordinarily can obtain patents on the applications that result from its efforts (Strandburg 2005 ).
An alternative justification might rest on the assumption that closing the gap between academia and application requires that scientists codify and translate their research results into terms that industry actors can understand. Even here the need for patents to accomplish this seems debatable in many instances. Because the internal governance regime of academic science demands publication, scientists are forced to invest in codifying their work so that other scientists can understand it. Companies that are likely to be invest in developing downstream applications of academic research often employ scientists who are capable of 25 interpreting the scientific literature. It is unlikely that patents are more effective disclosures to industry scientists than journal publications.
Perhaps patents are needed facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge that is missing from journal publications. Here, too, some skepticism is warranted. There is a constant flow of tacit knowledge from academia to commercial enterprises, since most PhD recipients are employed by commercial firms. While university patents might facilitate collaborative research between academia and industry, as discussed in the previous section, the primary facilitator of collaboration is probably industry funding, which one suspects is aimed more at pushing academic research in directions of interest to industry than at searching for applications of existing upstream discoveries.
In any event, whether or not university patents sometimes succeed in incentivizing companies or scientists to engage in efforts to bridge the lab-tomarket gap, there are indications that patenting often is employed by universities primarily to obtain exclusive rights over and thereby monetize immediately applicable scientific discoveries (Lemley 2008) . Indeed, a skeptic might argue that, rather than pushing academics to assist in developing downstream applications of their discoveries, enhanced university patenting has tended to push patent doctrine in the direction of more upstream claims. If this is the case, university patenting may have distracted entrepreneurs on both sides of the academic-commercial divide from the hard work of developing practical 26 applications of upstream university discoveries and focused them instead on monetizing patents on discoveries, such as at least some medical diagnostic methods, for which much of the research is publicly funded and additional development costs are minimal. 16 While university patenting undoubtedly results in a transfer of money to universities in this scenario, it does not lead to greater efforts to bridge the gap between university and marketplace.
In hindsight, it is not surprising that academic scientists would try to bend the availability of patents to suit the goals of the research community, rather than the social goals of the Bayh-Dole legislation, while at the same time the availability of patents might distort the goals and policies of the research community. Any boundary-spanning activity is a negotiation, in which players on both sides seek to further their own goals. Academic scientists are motivated primarily by and rewarded primarily for the discovery and publication of cuttingedge scientific results. Academic scientists presumably choose the academic career path because of their preferences for its rewards. Though patents may offer them a way to "earn money on the side," the benefit of that additional income (whether they receive it personally or fold it back into their research budgets) must be balanced against the opportunity costs of time spent away from their primary research activities. Clearly, if academic researchers can "have their cake
and eat it too" by patenting research tools and immediately commercializable scientific discoveries for which the internal governance system also rewards them, they will do so, thus avoiding the opportunity costs of working to bridge the gap between the market and truly upstream research results . Similarly, they may be inclined to shift their research agendas into areas that are both scientifically interesting and relatively easily commercializable (the so-called Pasteur's Quadrant) (Stokes 1997) . Only very large outside rewards, however, are likely to motivate scientists to invest significant effort in technology development that has no substantial scientific payoff.
To step back from this specific example, the broader point is that the disclosure and dissemination of creative output from a creative group to the broader public will often require investments that the group will not be internally motivated to make. Intellectual property is one means to attempt to incentivize those investments. However, as the academic research example shows, the implications and effectiveness of "tacking on" intellectual property to a group's governance regime may sometimes be unpredictable and complex.
A far less risky approach, when possible, would be to shift a group's incentives by decreasing the costs of disclosure and dissemination to outsiders.
Clearly the internet and other digital technologies have vastly decreased these costs overall, permitting creative groups to extend their reach both to fellow creators and to outsiders. However, it is also clear from the internal experience of many creative groups that the mere availability of cheap communication channels 28 may not be sufficient, and that the development of institutional arrangements to lower these costs is also an important task.
On a different tack, it may be worth exploring the role that trademarks appear to play at the interface between creative groups and outsiders. Trademarks appear to be consistent with the information governance regimes of many creative groups and seem to be the intellectual property regime of choice for at least some 
The Interaction of Intellectual Property With a Creative Group's
Information Governance Regime
Unlike the previous five issues, the interaction of intellectual property with a creative group's information governance regime has no analogue in the experience of individuals and firms. Perhaps for this reason, it is an issue about which there is a relative paucity of discussion by intellectual property scholars (but see, e.g., Barnett (2011) . It is almost tautological to observe that intellectual property, if available to individual members of a creative group as an independent alternative to the group's governance regime, lowers the costs of defecting from the group. Intellectual property, depending upon its doctrinal features, may also provide rewards that do not take account of the extent to which the work builds upon or incorporates group creative output, which the member accessed through 29 the internal governance regime. In addition, certain deployments of intellectual property by a group member may constitute defection from the group because they conflict with the group's internal information governance regime.
On the other hand, open source software provides an example of the use of intellectual property to define a creative group and enforce its governance regime.
Open source software provides an interesting puzzle with regard to outsider outsider has no effect whatsoever on the community's rights to its original software. There is no "propertization" of the community's pre-existing code.
Moreover, commercial companies are permitted to use and modify GPL-licensed software to turn a profit so long as they do not distribute the modified version without a copyleft clause.
The copyleft clause thus prohibits only a very specific kind of free riding- proprietary software production, may provide important rewards, including free use, enjoyment, reputation, experience, and so forth.
The rhetoric about "propertization" thus may be best understood as referring not to a particular code embodiment, but to the system for code production. The copyleft clause helps to preserve the open source system in the face of competition from the proprietary system, not by constraining outsiders, but by governing the behavior of insiders and ensuring reciprocity between members of the loosely-knit group involved in improving the code. It is an ingenious mechanism for pooling the individual copyrights of community members so that they cannot effectively use those individual rights to defect from and extract value from the community.
Concerns about the potential for destabilization of a creative group's information governance regime may explain at least in part several situations in 31 which insiders have lobbied against patents in their fields of technology.
Examples include opposition to software patents, patents on methods of medical treatment and diagnosis, tax method patents, and financial patents. In one interesting "defense" of a group's governance regime, physicians reacted strongly when a fellow physician attempted to enforce patent claims on a medical procedure, lobbying for and obtaining a statutory change that abolished patent remedies for infringement of such patents by physicians (Strandburg 2013, forthcoming) . Since its enactment, the statute has lain virtually dormant, though it would seem ripe for litigation as to the scope of its operation, perhaps because the push to obtain the statute reinforced a strong social norm among physician innovators that improvements in medical procedures must be, in effect, returned to the common pool.
The observation that the availability of intellectual property to individual members of a creative group generally lowers the costs of defecting from the group tells us little, however, about many important empirical questions. Under what circumstances, for example, will groups adopt governance regimes that permit or preclude particular uses of intellectual property? When will the availability of intellectual property rights lower the costs of defecting enough to have a significant impact on a group's internal governance regime, potentially even destroying it? In what situations do the benefits of intellectual property as a means to navigate boundary situations outweigh its costs to the group's 32 information governance regime? When and how can intellectual property be deployed, as it has been in the copyleft provision, to reinforce a group's governance system?
Even if it is empirically established that the availability of intellectual property would pose a threat to a particular creative group's information governance regime, it is not immediately apparent that this is problematic from a societal perspective. A group's information governance regime might be designed, at least in part, to serve the vested (and potentially anti-competitive)
interests of current members at the expense of the larger society. The medieval guild system is widely cited as an example of such a regime (Merges 2004 ).
Individuals may be excluded from creative groups for all kinds of reasons, including, potentially, gender or racial bias. Intellectual property rights are one way for outsiders to force their way into a creative arena, to disrupt overlyfriendly relations between competitors or to break barriers of bias (this is the flip side of the "patent troll" issue). It is probably unavoidable that the availability of legally-defined intellectual property rights can threaten both fruitful collaborations and cartels.
Where Do We Go From Here?
The answer to the question of whether, when, and in what form intellectual property forwards society's goals depends on a complex, contextually-contingent, comparative institutional analysis. It also depends heavily on the particulars of intellectual property doctrine and the efficiency of its practical implementation.
Though we cannot expect definitive answers to this complex question in the near term, I see two types of research tasks ahead.
First, it is eminently clear that we need more empirical information about creative groups, how they are governed internally, how they interact with outsiders, and how they relate to the intellectual property system. If it is true, as I believe it is, that creative groups that have opted out of the legally-defined intellectual property system play a major role in creative production, understanding these groups cannot be a peripheral part of intellectual property scholarship, but must move to the center, as it is beginning to do. Similarly, to the degree that intellectual property plays an important role as these groups interact with the larger society, those who study these alternative innovation regimes should interrogate the role of intellectual property in those interactions.
Second, despite the lack of conclusive empirical information, legal scholars must incorporate these institutional considerations into debates about the interpretation of current doctrine and the desirability of proposed reforms. For example, patent law's prohibition on patenting natural phenomena and scientific principles is a longstanding doctrine which implicitly accommodates the regime of open science. Copyright's prohibition on rights in ideas has a similar function.
Debates about the boundaries of such doctrines should be informed not only (and 34 perhaps not even principally) by the theoretical juxtaposition of the individual and the public domain, but by the institutional considerations discussed here.
Institutional realities should also be taken into account in proposals for modification of existing doctrines and should play a central role in debate about proposals for reform.
